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Abstract 
Three deficiencies exist in information security under prevailing practices: organisations tend to focus on 
compliance over protection; to estimate risk without investigating it; and to assess risk on an occasional (as 
opposed to continuous) basis. These tendencies indicate that important data is being missed and that the 
situation awareness of decision-makers in many organisations is currently inadequate. This research-in-
progress paper uses Endsley's situation awareness theory, and examines how the structure and functions of the 
US national security intelligence enterprise—a revelatory case of enterprise situation awareness development in 
security and risk management—correspond with Endsley’s theoretical model, and how facets of the US 
enterprise might be adapted to improve situation awareness in the information security risk management process 
of organisations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The modern organisation is essentially built of information: almost everything the organisation is and does 
involves information’s storage, use, or communication. Information security is a broad term that essentially 
refers to the practice of protecting information and the ways in which it is used to serve the goals of an 
organisation (Whitman and Mattord 2004). Given the supreme role of information in the functions of 
organisations, the importance of information security is widely acknowledged (Baskerville 1991; Shedden et al. 
2010). Laws and standards designed to guide information security practices have become more prevalent 
worldwide. These laws and standards typically endorse a “risk management” approach to information security. 
The object of risk management is to identify sources of risk and deal with them appropriately. Managing 
information security risks effectively, however, requires accurate appraisal of the organisation’s overall 
information security situation, and there is evidence that, under prevailing practices, much of the information 
required to model risk representatively is simply not being incorporated into organisations’ information security 
risk assessments (Parker 2007; Shedden et al. 2011; Shedden et al. 2010; Utin et al. 2008).  
A review of information security literature revealed that organisations tend to focus on compliance over 
protection (Johnson 2009; Matwyshyn 2009; Shedden et al. 2010; Young and Windsor 2010); to estimate risk 
rather than investigating it (Parker 2007; Richardson 2011; Shedden et al. 2011; Utin et al. 2008); and to assess 
risk on an occasional—as opposed to continuous—basis (Rees and Allen 2008; Schmittling 2010; Hulme 2004). 
Each of these tendencies describes a way in which important security status information is being omitted from 
Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) decision making. The decisions that senior managers need to 
make relating to their organizations' information security postures (e.g. whether to change the way the 
organization does things to avoid negative situations that could cost it money, damage its reputation, or 
otherwise impede its accomplishment of strategic objectives) need to be informed by accurate understanding of 
the risks their particular organizations are actually faced with.  
We argue that this problem can be described as one of leaders and their subordinates lacking situation awareness 
in regard to the security states of their organizations. The decision-makers in many organizations are neither 
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registering how developments within their operational environments affect the security of their information and 
information systems, nor recognizing how the functionality and strategic interests of the organization as a whole 
are contingent upon this security. This research-in-progress paper is part of a research project which aims to 
develop an intelligence-driven ISRM process that maximizes situation awareness among the decision-makers 
involved in that process. In this initial stage of the project we use a document-based case study to identify 
whether Endsley’s situation awareness model can be utilized at an organisation level. Ultimately, our aim is to 
answer the following research question: 
“How can situation awareness be increased in information security risk management?” 
This research-in-progress paper is organized as follows. The background to the study is discussed including the 
literature on information systems security and an introduction of Endsley’s situational awareness model (1995).  
Next the research approach for the research is presented.  Following this, a document-based case study is 
presented in which Endsley’s model is used to develop an a priori version of the ISRM model.  We conclude 
this research-in-progress paper with a discussion of the project’s outlook and its potential 
implications/contributions. 
BACKGROUND 
This section reviews two relevant literature areas.  It first examines work in information security risk assessment.  
Secondly, it discusses situational awareness, in particularly Endsley’s model of situational awareness. 
Information Security and Risk Assessment 
In the literature on information security risk management practices three apparently endemic deficiencies were 
uncovered: (1) Security risk assessment is aimed at compliance rather than protection; (2) Security risks are 
estimated without investigation; and (3) Security risk is not assessed historically and continuously. 
Security risk assessment is aimed at compliance rather than protection 
Many organisations treat compliance with laws and standards as ends rather than means (e.g. Johnson 2009; 
Matwyshyn 2009; Shedden et al. 2010; Young and Windsor 2010).  Neither the technical fulfilment of legal 
obligations nor the perception of having fulfilled a standard is the same as achieving information security, 
however (Matwyshyn 2009; Shedden et al. 2010, von Grebmer 2006). Laws and standards are generic by design 
and their provisions are consequently vague (Broderick 2006; Siponen 2006; Siponen and Willison 2009). An 
organisation’s unique and dynamic situation cannot be addressed by laws or standards alone (Baskerville 1991). 
An organisation can be deemed 100 percent compliant under conventionally accepted standards without having 
actually achieved a state of information security (von Grebmer 2006). When compliance with externally formed 
ideals is held to be the goal, protection may be assured theoretically, but it is not assured actually. 
Security risks are estimated without investigation 
Whilst the existence of standards and legal requirements reinforces the message that information security is 
important, the degree to which information security is unique to each organisation appears to be widely 
misunderstood (Parker 2007; Richardson 2011; Shedden et al. 2011; Utin et al. 2008). Standardized approaches 
to risk estimation are rarely useful toward estimating the specific risks that a particular organisation is faced 
with. Rather, these methods lead practitioners to settle on guessed values and imagined probabilities virtually 
prima facie (Baskerville 1991). Nevertheless, such approaches are commonly accepted by many organisations as 
adequate means for managing information security risk (Parker 2007; Utin et al. 2008). Risk cannot be properly 
managed unless it is fully understood (Humphreys 2008). To understand information security risk fully, 
organisations must ensure that the roles and characteristics of the information assets their business processes 
depend on are understood through ongoing, conscientious investigation, and that lessons learned become matters 
of record.  
Security risk is not assessed historically and continuously 
Many organisations conduct information security risk assessments as infrequent events occurring somewhere 
between quarterly and yearly (Rees and Allen 2008). When carried out this way, a detailed assessment can 
become overwhelming because all of the pertinent information must be gathered within a limited time frame. 
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Furthermore, information gathered at any one point in time only constitutes a status “snapshot” of the 
organisation’s actually fluid information security environment (Schmittling 2010). Hulme notes that “A risk 
assessment conducted on the first day of the month can be quite different than the same assessment conducted 
several weeks later;” and that risk can be most effectively minimized by keeping “eternally vigilant” (2004). 
Ahmad, Hadgkiss and Ruighaver (2012) argue that it is also important for organisations to retain memory of past 
security incidents and identified problem indications. In their failure to remain attentive and retentive, many 
organisations are missing out on vital risk-pertinent data about current developments and long-term trends that 
could afford them advance warning, by means of predictive analysis, of impending incidents. 
Summary of risk assessment deficiencies  
Each of the three flaws outlined above describes a way that important information about risk is misapprehended 
or simply missed altogether. Without this information, managers' understandings of their organisations' security 
situations are fragmentary. We argue that this problem can be described as one of leaders and their subordinates 
lacking situation awareness concerning the security states of their organisations.  
The phenomenon known as situation awareness (SA), as it is explained by Endsley’s (1995) SA theory, occurs 
when an actor, whose function is to decide and act appropriately on (or in response to) a situation, has the 
relevant status information he or she requires about the elements of (i.e. the “different things going on” within) 
this situation of interest to decide and act appropriately. As SA theory describes how decision-making actors 
come to understand the contexts within which they function, we argue that it is an appropriate theory for the 
current project, which aims to increase information security risk managers’ awareness of their organizations’ 
respective security situations. 
Theoretical basis: Endsley’s theory of situation awareness 
Mica Endsley’s theory of SA is by far the most widely accepted and validated theory of SA (Salmon 2008). 
While other authors have modelled some aspects of SA differently, or have argued that an SA theory should 
draw on theoretical underpinnings different from those Endsley has drawn upon, a review of the literature failed 
to uncover any arguments that genuinely undermine the validity of her theory or that offer better—or, we would 
argue, even significantly different—explanations of how people come to develop awareness of situational states 
in the context of goal-oriented activities. 
Endsley defines SA as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley 1988, in Endsley 
and Jones 2011). In Endsley’s model, SA is achieved in progressive stages. In Level 1 SA, one perceives, or 
becomes aware of, “the status, attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment” (Endsley 1988, 
in Endsley and Jones 2011). Failure to achieve Level 1 SA essentially amounts to a failure to perceive relevant 
information about the environment, given one’s information requirements in light of one’s goals and objectives. 
In Level 2 SA, one compares perceptions of the environment against one’s internally held understanding of, or 
associations regarding, this incoming information (“prototypical situations in memory;” Endsley 1995). Failure 
to achieve Level 2 SA amounts to a failure to understand what has been perceived, which can stem from 
information overload or from having inadequate informational templates (e.g. “mental models” held in human 
memory) to reference in processing and interpreting the sensed/incoming information (Endsley 1995). When 
Level 2 SA is achieved, one is aware of information’s intrinsic meaning(s), as well as its significance in the 
context of functional goals and objectives. 
Level 3 SA occurs when one is able to extrapolate the implications of things perceived about the environment, to 
predict what will happen “at least in the very near term,” based on one’s extant understanding of cause and effect 
relationships between the elements of a situation (Endsley 1995). To achieve Level 3 SA, one must already have 
developed Level 2 SA. Level 3 SA enables one to anticipate and plan for alternative future scenarios. Failure at 
this level can stem from information overload or inadequate subject matter knowledge (Endsley and Jones 2011). 
Endsley’s model portrays SA as a phenomenon that occurs in the context of decision-making, as it recognizes 
SA to be purposeful or goal oriented: “Goals form the basis for most decision making in dynamic environments” 
(Endsley 1995). What we might call “high fidelity” Level 3 SA, or Level 3 SA borne out of assessing the 
situation of interest accurately, and interpreting it rationally in the context of goals and objectives, becomes the 
basis for informed decision making (Endsley and Jones 2011). Endsley’s model of SA is depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Endsley’s Situation Awareness Model (Adapted from Endsley 1995) 
Above and below the chain from perception to action upon a situation (grouped into coloured boxes in Figure 1) 
are task/system and individual factors that bear on the SA development and decision making processes. All of 
these factors only become meaningful in the context of a specific individual or system. As our project concerns 
coordinated or “team” SA development, however, the roles of “goals and objectives”—which are shared 
between team members—have special relevance and are ultimately singled out for representation in our adapted 
model. Endsley explains that SA within a team involves “a specific set of SA elements” for each member, 
pertinent to his or her functions within the team, with some overlapping between these elements (Endsley 1995). 
Overlapping occurs where goals and objectives are shared between team members. Similarly, any member may 
acquire information that meets the SA needs/requirements of another member and, in such a case, this 
information should be shared (Endsley 1995). Endsley defines the SA of the team as “the degree to which every 
team member possesses the SA required for his or her responsibilities” (Endsley 1995). 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
This is a design science research project employing mixed qualitative analytical methods. The overall project’s 
design comprises the following phases: (1) a literature review to identify a gap/need in the information security 
subject area; (2) adaptation of Endsley’s theoretical model of SA to include supported second-party decision 
making; (3) a single case revelatory case study (Yin 2009) in which open source documents were textually 
analysed and coded (Carley 1993; Neuman 2011) to determine whether the functions of the USNSIE correspond 
with the adapted model; (4) the specification of an a priori model for an ISRM process in particular, based on 
findings from the literature review and logical analogues between US national security intelligence enterprise 
components and the components of typical organisations; (5) expert interviews with information security risk 
managers to validate or revise components of the a priori model; (6) the specification of a revised model based 
on expert input; and (7) focus groups to refine and validate the revised model. Of these 7 phases, 1-4 have been 
completed.  
Case study of the US national security intelligence enterprise: enterprise SA production 
We argue that the US stands as the world’s richest organisation in terms of both its wealth and the complexity of 
its critical national infrastructure. Its national security intelligence enterprise represents perhaps the ultimate 
example of SA in the interest of asset protection. The US Intelligence Community (IC) is composed of 17 
specialised but coordinated elements dedicated to collecting and processing information required by decision-
makers to establish awareness vis-à-vis national security issues (ODNI 2011). As the US National Security 
Intelligence Enterprise (USNSIE), which comprises the US IC and the military and governmental decision-
makers that the IC serves, describes an SA enterprise devoted to informing the management of risks to national 
security, we argue that the USNSIE provides a revelatory case of how SA can be achieved across a security risk 
management enterprise. The object of the case study was to understand how the USNSIE develops SA and 
facilitates the SA of decision makers in government; the purpose of doing this was to derive a process model for 
enterprise SA development. The case study involved the analysis of 71 documents. The documents analysed 
included US law, IC policy documents (Intelligence Community Directives or “ICDs”), military manuals and 
other US Government publications, US Government websites, and authoritative works produced by subject 
matter experts.  
24th Australasian Conference on Information Systems Intelligence-Driven ISRM for Organisations 
4-6 Dec 2013, Melbourne Webb, Maynard, Ahmad & Shanks 
Initially, open coding (Neuman 2011) was carried out on 32 ICDs and 5 pieces of US legislation to compile a 
lexical concordance of named actors and functions (Carley 1993). The concordance was constructed, using 
Microsoft Word, in the form of a large (171pages) table consisting of 154 entries. ICDs and legislation were 
selected for analysis based on their titles and apparent themes. Axial coding followed open coding. The object of 
axial coding is to evaluate previously developed codes for their utility in describing themes of interest within the 
study (Neuman 2011). We realized that the vast majority of the data we had collected concerned details that—
though they concerned the structure of the USNSIE at the highest strategic level—were still too specific (and 
complex) for adaptation into analogue components for a realistic organizational ISRM process model. 
Furthermore, while we now had a fair idea of the USNSIE’s structure and role in government, our understanding 
of how intelligence is actually created and disseminated within this enterprise was still lacking.  
A search of available literature revealed that no theory has been accepted as a definitive explanation of the 
process by which a national security intelligence enterprise informs decision making (Treverton et al. 2006). 
Typically, the overall process of identifying the intelligence needs of decision-makers and carrying out the 
operations required to meet these needs is described in terms of a conceptual framework known as the 
“intelligence cycle” (Johnson 2012). The intelligence cycle is a feedback loop divided into phases of activity. 
The number of discrete phases composing this cycle is a matter of opinion and varies across authors. We argue 
that the intelligence cycle is most accurately depicted as a twelve phase cycle, as this allots a discrete phase for 
each component activity. While the intelligence cycle is a useful heuristic for understanding how intelligence 
generally informs decision making, it does not in itself constitute a detailed process description, however. Thus, 
our next step was to assemble a suitable process description. 
We created an outline of the intelligence cycle in which each phase represented the heading of a section. We 
then reviewed the entries of the actors and functions table to determine the most key/central actors at the highest 
enterprise levels. Next, we constructed a step-by-step account of what happens within the USNSIE throughout 
the intelligence cycle. As we drafted this account, its components were considered for their overall 
representativeness, centrality, and level of granularity within the USNSIE: actors that were too specific to the 
peculiar functions of the enterprise, or which served less than central functions, were considered poor candidates 
for adaptation into a high level process model and were omitted from our account on that basis. Essentially, this 
phase consisted of multiple iterations of selective coding, during which data was reorganized under themes to 
further inform our understanding of “major themes or concepts” of interest (Neuman 2011).  
At this stage we still lacked a robust theoretical template on which to propose a process model. A search for 
theory relating to the role of situation awareness in decision making and action ultimately led us to Mica 
Endsley’s SA theory. To determine whether Endsley’s theoretical model of SA could be used to describe the 
USNSIE, we then applied the pattern matching variation of the illustrative method (Neuman 2011). Neuman 
explains that the illustrative method involves deriving “empty boxes” from components of pre-existent theory 
and then filling these boxes with findings from research data (2011). In our case, these “empty boxes” were 
structural components of Endsley’s theoretical model, which we “filled” with case study data. We compared 
concepts within SA theory (i.e. task and system factors, stages of SA development, decision and action phases, 
and its feedback loop) to the phases of the intelligence cycle to identify points of analogy. We then sought to 
adapt Endsley’s model to better describe the way a team of actors can serve as “purveyors of situation 
awareness” to decision makers the context of an intelligence enterprise. 
This involved successive approximation, described by Neuman as “(a) method of qualitative data analysis that 
repeatedly moves back and forth between the empirical data and the abstract concepts, theories, or models, 
adjusting theory and refining data collection each time” (2011). Evidence from the case study was considered 
and reconsidered within the context of Endsley’s SA-development/decision/action cycle to yield a process 
template describing enterprise SA production in support of a single decision making actor. Figure 2 illustrates 
how the intelligence cycle framework can be represented as an adapted situation awareness process model. The 
process of developing SA, whether it is confined to individual experience or applied to a distributed enterprise, 
describes the organisation and interpretation of situational element status data into an overall understanding of a 
situation. While Endsley’s model of individual SA pertains to an individual acting directly upon or in response to 
a situation, Figure 2 portrays SA development through the concerted effort of multiple actors whose overall 
function is to develop and then export this SA to a consumer who then acts (or directs action) on or in response 
to the situation of interest. In Figure 2, US IC actors have been simplistically divided into two types: collection 
components and analysis components. Table 1 maps correspondences between the intelligence cycle and SA 
theory.  
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Figure 2: Enterprise SA in the Context of the Intelligence Cycle 
Table 1: Correspondences between the Intelligence Cycle and SA Theory 
Intelligence Cycle Phases 1, 2 and 3:  Requirements, 
Planning, and Direction 
SA Theory Analogue Goals and Objectives 
Explanation The goals and objectives of decision-makers determine intelligence requirements. These requirements are then 
translated into operational requirements at the IC element level (ICD 900; JP 2-0). In phases 2 and 3, planning and direction 
by IC leadership determines the goals and objectives of operators within IC elements (ODNI 2011). These goals and 
objectives provide the context by which situational element states are judged—determining what needs to be perceived and 
why, and informing understanding of developments’ implications, given the goals and objectives of the decision-making 
intelligence consumer (ODNI 2011). 
Intelligence Cycle Phases 4, 5, and 6: Collection, 
Processing, and Exploitation 
SA Theory Analogue Level 1 SA (Perception) 
Explanation: During collection, situational element state data is gathered by human or technical assets (Johnson 2012; JP 2-
0). Perception occurs when element states are perceptible by conscious agents (Endsley 1995). In human assets, collection 
and processing can occur concurrently; human perception of technical data occurs after some machine processing (JP 2-0; 
Miller 2004). Exploitation requires basic relevance recognition and is often automated to some extent (JP 2-0; ICD 300; 
ODNI 2011). Humans facilitate exploitation by labelling and classifying information for easy discovery or by forwarding 
information where useful (Miller 2004; ODNI 2011). 
Intelligence Cycle Phase 7: Analysis SA Theory Analogues Level 2 SA (Comprehension); Level 3 SA 
(Projection); Decision 
Explanation Situational comprehension occurs at the analysis phase of the intelligence cycle (Katter, Montgomery and 
Thompson 1979). Analysis can focus on anywhere from current to long term situations, and often draws on the expertise of 
multiple specialist analysts to develop multidimensional comprehension of a particular situation (JP 2-0). Analysts are 
commonly expected to apply their knowledge in the subject area to anticipate the implications of a situation's current status, 
and its likely future state, for decision-makers' goals and objectives (USG 2009). Analysts decide and act across analysis, 
production, evaluation and dissemination.  
Intelligence Cycle Phase 8: Production SA Theory Analogues Decision; Action 
Explanation The process of creating a coherent piece of finished intelligence explaining the analyst's findings, rationale, 
limitations, recommendations, etc., is referred to as "production;" the finished intelligence, which can be in any media format, 
is often referred to as an "intelligence product" (ODNI 2011). The analyst must make decisions that amount to findings as 
well as decisions about how to communicate these findings in the final product, given the stated needs of the consumer.  
Intelligence Cycle Phase 9: Evaluation SA Theory Analogues Decision; Action 
Explanation The analyst, and under some circumstances the analyst's superior, must also carry out an evaluation of the 
intelligence product, to verify  that it fulfils the consumer/decision-maker’s stated intelligence requirements, prior to the 
product's dissemination (ICD 203). Both production and evaluation can involve reiterations of decision and action when 
products are evaluated negatively (JP 2-0; ICD 203). 
Intelligence Cycle Phase 10: Dissemination SA Theory Analogue Action 
Explanation The action of disseminating a useful and appropriate intelligence product is the ultimate functional objective of 
the intelligence analyst (Treverton and Gabbard 2008). Intelligence products may be disseminated physically, electronically, 
presented formally or simply communicated, depending on the type of intelligence involved, consumer needs and 
specifications, and temporal, locational, or other practical considerations (ODNI 2011). 
Intelligence Cycle Phase 11: Consumption SA Theory Analogue Level 1 SA (Perception); Level 2 SA 
(Comprehension); Level 3 SA (Projection) 
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Explanation The disseminated product is consumed (listened to, read, or otherwise perceived) by the decision-maker (ODNI 
2011). Consumption initiates the process of SA synthesis in the mind of the consumer. Consumed intelligence is not always 
passively assimilated; the decision-maker often compares the product’s contents to information held in memory to develop 
personal understanding of the situation (Lowenthal 2000). While perception and lower level comprehension may occur in 
rapid succession, higher level comprehension of the situation and the internal formation of projections by the decision-maker 
may require a period of reflection and rumination. 
Intelligence Cycle Phase 12: Feedback SA Theory Analogue Action 
Explanation In the context of the intelligence cycle, feedback refers to the decision-maker's confirmation or denial, to an IC 
liaison, that the intelligence product has met his or her stated information requirements regarding the situation of interest 
(ODNI, 2011). It is an action by the decision-maker that is inherent to the cycle itself. 
Though integral to the USNSIE, issuing feedback is not, of course, the decision-maker's definitive function. The 
role of the decision-maker is to make decisions that lead to action on, or in reaction to, a situation of interest, as 
necessary in light of strategic goals and objectives. If the incoming intelligence suggests that a situation requires 
action, then the decision-maker will make a decision concerning what action is required and, to some extent, 
how it should be carried out. In many cases, the decision-maker in government does not carry out an action but 
rather directs one or more proxy actors to do so (Johnson 2012; Lowenthal 2000). Alternatively, if intelligence 
suggests that the situation is already conducive to the goals and objectives of the decision-maker, action may not 
be required. Yet another possibility is that the intelligence presents the situation differently than the decision-
maker had previously conceived of it, and the decision-maker must revise his or her goals and objectives to 
accommodate this new understanding (Lowenthal 2000). If action affecting the relative state of the situation is 
carried out by the decision-maker or proxy, the situation changes and a new enterprise SA development and 
synthesis process must be undertaken by the US IC and the decision-maker to establish current awareness of it.  
DISCUSSION 
In the previous section, we have argued that the USNSIE is actually an example of enterprise SA. We will now 
argue that this enterprise model can be applied toward the design of a situation-aware ISRM process for 
organizations. Just as an enterprise consists of layered activities, enterprise SA must also be considered at 
multiple levels. In Figure 2, the combined efforts of the entire intelligence community have been simplified into 
one tier of a two-tiered model. While this may accurately depict the nature of the enterprise at a high level, the 
reader must remember that the model can be adapted to describe any transaction in which SA is developed by an 
actor or team of actors and provided to another actor who then decides and acts in response to the situation of 
interest. This is to say that the model can be adapted to describe activity between all layers of the SA enterprise.  
In the next section we present an adapted, a priori model describing a situation-aware/intelligence-driven ISRM 
process at the business process level. It is the second of three diagrams (depicting [1] transactions between 
department level collection and analysis assets and business process owners; [2] transactions between business 
process owners and the ISRM Manager; and [3] transactions between the ISRM Manager and an executive level 
officer, such as a Chief Information Security Officer, or Chief Security or Risk Officer, where such a 
relationship exists within the hierarchy of an organization) that have been developed to describe the proposed 
process. The others have been omitted from this paper due to space considerations.  
An a priori model for intelligence-driven ISRM 
We propose that enterprise SA development in ISRM should start with collection and analysis at the department 
level. The departments are intrinsically specialized to carry out particular functions within the organisation, and 
should be most familiar with the information assets located under their respective functions. Responsibility for 
ISRM should be distributed across business process owners (Coles and Moulton 2003), who have tasking 
authority over collection and analysis components embedded within the departments. The business process 
owners report up to the ISRM head, subordinate to the organisation’s risk or security executive (where one 
exists). 
At the department level, the security statuses of specific information assets are the collection targets. If multiple 
information assets that fall under the same department are interdependent or otherwise interact with each other, 
the department-level intelligence component is responsible for collecting status information relating both to the 
separate information assets as well as to their interactions between each other. "Information assets" includes 
pieces of hardware, software, network assets, individual people, specific procedures, and data assets (Whitman 
and Mattord 2004).  
While the security states of hardware, software, and network assets generally fall under the purview of the 
organisation's IT department regardless of the business process concerned, other information assets supporting a 
business process, such as the people, procedures and pieces of information involved, may be distributed across 
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several departments. Collection targets should be developed with guidance from the enterprise and business 
process levels in the form of refined and prioritized intelligence requirements. Intelligence forwarded from 
departmental collection and analysis components is received and aggregated by business process owners, who 
then perform business process level analyses. The products resulting from these analyses are then disseminated 
upward to the ISRM head, who aggregates the findings to perform a whole-enterprise security assessment.  
Figure 3 depicts our a priori model of intelligence-driven ISRM at the business process level. The diagram 
illustrates the relationship between each business process owner and the Information Security Risk Manager. The 
relationship between all business process owners and the manager can be similarly modelled, however, in much 
the same way as the upper tier of Figure 2 represents the combined efforts of US IC components. In Figure 3, 
authority to act on a process level situation is generally delegated to the business process owner, subject to 
oversight by the ISRM Manager. A similar diagram applies to the relationships between department level 
collection and analysis assets and each business process owner, wherein the department level assets assume the 
upper tier of the diagram, the business process owners assume the lower tier, and authority to act on a 
department level situation is held by the business process owner(s) involved, but may be delegated to an actor at 
the department level. 
 
Figure 3: Intelligence-Driven ISRM at the Business Process Level 
CONCLUSION 
This research-in-progress paper has discussed the development of an intelligence-driven ISRM process model 
for organisations. It has described three types of SA deficiencies identified in information security literature and 
proposes an enterprise SA model, derived from a case study of the USNSIE, to improve SA in ISRM. The next 
step for this research project will be to conduct interviews with subject matter experts from the ISRM field. The 
point of these interviews will be to elicit expert advice concerning the general feasibility of the a priori model as 
presented here, as well as general, high level recommendations for improving it. Following incorporation of this 
input, we will then present the resulting model to a focus group. While the purpose of the initial expert 
interviews will be to determine what components—if any—of the model are considered valid propositions in the 
broad sense, the purpose of the focus groups will be to revise, refine, and validate lower level components of the 
formerly validated high level model.  
The intelligence driven ISRM process model has several important implications for practitioners and researchers. 
First, it will enable more accurate estimations of risk in information security by distributing the assessment 
workload across the enterprise, rendering more detailed assessments practicable.  Second, it will institute 
continuous monitoring and reporting/documentation practices, increasing the chances of threat detection while 
also enabling trend mapping and predictive analysis. The net result of this for practitioners will be better- 
informed decision-making in ISRM at both the business process and whole enterprise levels. As the model 
approaches ISRM from a business process security perspective, it links ISRM directly to the strategic business 
interests of the organisation, increasing the likelihood of enthusiastic support by upper management. 
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The model will also provide the basis for further research in situation-aware/intelligent information security risk 
management. The model should ultimately be developed into a complete method that guides organizations 
through the process of SA/intelligence requirements identification, as well as through ISRM-specific collection 
and analysis procedures. Empirical work needs to be done to evaluate the actual feasibility of the model and any 
resulting method. Action research studies implementing ISRM methods based on the model resulting from this 
project would be particularly useful. 
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